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No. 73-1285 
WOOD, et al (School officials) ------------v. 
STRICKLAND, et al (School 
children and parents) 
Cert to CA8 -4r. H..a .·_, a.- Tjmely 
(Gibson, Heaney, Ross) ~ 
~ Federal/civil 
This is a§ 1983 action brought~ ~rade public school 
students ~nd their parents against school officials, the school 
board, and the school district in Mena, Arkansas. The defendants 
~ 
suspended the students for disciplinary reasons. Following a 
trial and a hung jury, the USDC directed a verdict against the 
ce 
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students as to all defendants. CAB reversed, ordering certain 
equitable relief and a trial on damages against individual members 
of the school board. Three CAB judges (Mehaffey, Stephenson, 
Hunter) dissented from CAB's denial of rehearing en bane. 
1. FACTS. Three 15 year old glrls "spiked" a punch bowl 
IV\ 
at a high school function. They pu~a small amount of malt liquor, 
apparently so diluted that it would have taken a chemical analysis 
to reveal it. Several days later they "confessed" to the school 
superintendent. That night, he called a meeting of the school 
board, without informing the students or their parents. The 
board took no 
rendering the 
evidence on whether the girls had succeeded in 
h . . . . 11 h. 1 punc _intoxicating or on essentia y any.5cng e se. 
One of the members of the board did, however, receive and relate 
~ 
to his colleagues a telephone call indicating that one of the three 
~ 
girls (whom he did not specify) had that night been involved 
in an altercation at a school basketball game. 
The board suspended all three girls for an entire semester. W,v.r 
(CAB remarked that the practical effect of the suspension was to 
cause the girls to fail their entire sophomore year. Apparently 
the girls were able to recoup the academic time by doubling up 
courses in the last 2 years of highs chool. The record of the 
e~l!c:.¾ 
supension, with its d::";z-t: on college or job applications, etc., 
was a different matter, of course). It acted pursuant to a 
disciplinary regulation of the school district, which provides 
in part: 









"b. Valid cause for suspension from school on 
first offense: Pupils found to be guilty of any 
of the following shall be suspended from school on 
the first offense for the balance of the semester 
and such suspension will be noted on the permanent 
record of the student along with reason for 
suspension. 
"(4) The use of intoxicating beverages or possession 
of same at a school sponsored activity." 
3. 
CA8 questioned the applicability of this regulation, on the 
ground that the girls had hardly had anything to do with 
"intoxicating" beverages. The court also noted that the board 
apparently did not feel bound by the regulation, since it 
considered (but rejected) other punishment, etc. 
After the suspension, the parents of the suspended children 
retained counsel and demanded a ·hearing. The board acceded to 
this demand, but apparently deliberately did not call to the 
hearing the two teachers who had accused the students at the 
first board meeting. The board then reaffirmed its decision 
to suspend, having heard no additional evidence as to whether 
the girls did in fact render the punch "intoxicating". This 
lawsuit followed. 
2. CA8 OPINION. CA8 cormnen~ed that the law with respect 
to the rights of students "is still developing". It recognized 
that the responsibility for public education is primarily the 
concern of the states. But the exercise of that responsibility 
must be consistent with constitutional requirements. Students 
cannot be given lengthy.supensions without being accorded 
. ~e 
\ 
tt w,~ I 
~v · 
-, "5 \ ~ 
- - 4 • 
~ntive)~ procedural due process." If they are suspended 
without due process, they may bring§ 1993 actions for declaratory 
and injunctive relief against the school district, the school 
board and the administrators involved. They may also sue for 
damages against the individual members of the board an d the 
administrator who participated in the decision. Good faith is 
a defense in damage actions, but not in actions for equitable 
relief. 
Following a statement of the above principles, CAB held 
l\'\i+,'~ 
that the 8iitt~~ board meeting had deprived the students of 
procedural due process (no notice, etc.). The procedural defects 
were probably cured by the subsequent hearing held by the board, 
but it didn't matter since the board had throughout denied the 
students substantive due process. This was because the board 
at no time made any effect to determine whether the students 
had indeed rendered the punch "intoxicating," in the terms of 
the regulation under which the students were suspended. The 
court had no doubt that the board could, if it wanted, pass a 
regulation that made use of any alcoholic beverage (as opposed 
to an "intoxicating" beverage) grounds for suspension. But it 
had not done so here. 
CA8 found the directed verdict in favor of the school -
district appropriate under Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), 
since a school district is immune from damages in a§ 1983 
action. Bu t it oydered that the students' records be cleared 
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nature. It further held a new trial should be held on the issue 
of damages against individual members of the school board. It 
declared that in such a trial the students need not prove specific 
intent or malice on the part of school officials. "It need only 
t be established that the defendants did not, in the light of all 
J the circumstances, act in good faith. The test is an objective, 
rather than a subjective one." 
3. DISSENT FROM DENIAL OF EN BANC REHEARING. In a sharply 
worded dissent from denial of an en bane rehearing, Chief Judge 
Mehaffey (joined by JJ. Stephenson and Webster) could not agree . -
that the due process clause of the 14th Amendment empowered a 
federal court to review public school disciplinary actiorton 
the basis of the sufficiency of the evidence. He believed that - ------, -
"the substantive reach of the due process clause on the public 
school campus is limited to the protection of specifically 
identifiable federal constitutional rights." Here there was no 
invasion of any federally-protected area of speech, association, ----religion or equality of race or sex. Also, the students had ---been accorded fair procedures. This is a case "where the school 
board had established a reasonable rule, the students had notice 
of the rule, the students by their own admission had violated the 
rule, and, after full procedural protection was afforded, the 
rule was enforced." Under those circumstances, J. Mehaffey 
could not see any constitutional question. 
7 
J. Mehaffey criticized the GAS panel's use of "free-wheeling" 







had long ago rejected. He opined that the panel's approach 
would remake federal courts into boards of appeal for school 
.. '-·--
6. 
board disciplinary actions, interfering with matters that are 
the prerogative of local government. 
4. THE PETITION. Petitioners for the most part track the 
points made by J. Mehaffey. Petitioners concede that the Bill 
of Rights applies on public school campuses and they welcome the 
efforts federal courts have made to protect constitutional rights 
in the school context . But here they see no infringement of 
any particular constitutional right; such as free speech, etc. 
In the absence of an infringement of a specific constitutional 
right, school disciplinary cases do not present a federal 
question . It is quite clear that ''education itself is not a 
federally protected right." San Antonio School District v. 
Rodriguez (1973). Most of the petition is moderate in tone, 
but at one point it shades into a · jury argument - "public school 
authorities cannot long maintain discipline and a proper 
atmosphere for learning with the ever present threat of the 
necessity for abandoning their educational responsibilities to 
appear in federal court at the behest of a disgruntled student 
or parent and attempt to convince a federal judge of the correct-
ness of suspension decisions." 
C 
Petitioners cha~~erize this as 
a sufficiency of the evidence case and say that federal courts 
should not take such school disciplinary matters. 
l 
Petitioners also express concern over the prospect that 
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They are particularly uneasy with CA.S's notion that a school 
official may be found liable under an "objective" standard, 
which they say may mean that the official had better be right. 
They state that the Court has not considered the immunity of 
public officials from suit in a school context. They claim 
CA conflict on this point and urge the Court to address the 
issue. They stress the chilling effect that the threat of per-
sonal liability may have on school officials called upon to 
make difficult and tendentious decisions with regard to discipline 
etc. 
5. THE RESPONSE. The response is lengthy, but has nothing 
significant to offer. It details in some length the actions of 
the school board in order to show that the board acted despicably, 
but this seems to be conceded. It does not really meet petitioner's 
principal contention that this is not 'a federal case. It speaks 
of a federa~-protected right to education and claims that the 
board denied procedural as well as substantive due process, 
but neither of those points evidently had much impact with 
CA8, which relied on neither. 
6. DISCUSSION. The school board acted outrageously by 
any reasonable standard; this was a case of punitive overkill 
-and of disregard for the harmful effects that a lengthy school 
suspension can have on a young student. But it's to~h to see 
CAS's "su~stantive due process" notion ~ the federal issue here. 
won't fly, and ' it's difficult to think of any specific con-
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symbolic protest in any respect. It's really just a school 
disciplinary case that was badly mishandled by school officials. 
Is that enough to support a§ 1983 suit for injunctive relief 
and damages? Also, should school officials be liable for damages 
in federal court in such a case? 
There is a response. 
4/1/74 
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No. 73-1285 WOOD v. STRICKLAND 
This is the incredible case from the 8th Circuit in which 
two 16 year old girls were suspended for the remainder of the 
term from high school for "spiking" punch at a school party. 
The case is incredible both because of the folly of the 
Merna Arkansas School Board and the intellectual folly of the 
CA8 panel which decided the case in favor of the students by 
holding that they were denied substantive due process and by 
then holding, in effect, that a school board member does not 
have even a qualified immunity from damage suits. 
Jack Owens wrote the cert memo and I certainly could not 
improve upon it. 
Neither of the briefs filed by the parties is conspicuously 
strong. That of petitioner's is, however, substantially more 
effective than the brief filed on behalf of respondent's. 
It is necessary to bear in mind that the issue before 
us is not one of procedural due process. The girls were 
(~~ 
rz~~ 
suspended initially on February 18 by the school board without 
notice or hearing of any kind. The Board reconsidered the 
suspension on March 2, 1972, at a meeting, duly noticed, and 
attended by members of the school board, the girls, their 
parents and counsel for all parties concerned. CAB said: 
"We recognize that the March 2 meeting may have 
cured the procedural defects because it was held 
promptly after the suspension, and because the 






the time and place of the meeting and were 
given an opportunity to present evidence. But 
we need not decide, whether, in fact, the 
meeting did so because the students were denied 
substantive due process at both .meetings." 
CAB then went on to review the evidence, and concluded 
2. 
as a matter of substantive due process that there was insufficient 
evidence to support the conclusion of the school board that its 
valid rule against intoxicating beverages had in fact been 
violated. CAB did not address the principal claim of the 
school authorities that no federal issue was presented, 
certainly in the absence of denial of appropriate procedural 
due process. This issue is argued - at two great a length -
in petitioner's brief (p. 14, et seq.) Relying on Rodriguez, 
and other cases, petitioners argue that there is no deprivation 
of a constitutionally derived right; that there is no right 
derived from the Constitution to attend public school; that 
this case is quite different from the constitutionally based 
rights of speech, association, religion or equal protection 
of the law. 
Respondent's brief really does not meet this argument. 
Essentially, respondent ducks the question by merging procedural 
and substantive due process into a single contention that 
school children do have constitutional rights to due process. 
I would agree that, even at the high school level, the right 
(indeed duty imposed by law) to attend public schools created 






cannot be denied in an appropriate case without the student 
being accorded procedural due process. The Roth doctrine 
is not limited to constitutionally based substantive rights. 
See, e.g., Roth, Fuentes, Mitchell v. Grant, Arnett v. Kennedy. 
But the error of CA9 was in assuming a substantive 
constitutional right and then -------- to a federal 
court the role of reviewing the evidence before a school 
board in a disciplinary matter in the same way that a federal 
appellate court would review the sufficiency of evidence in 
a criminal case decided by a district court. 
A second error in the opinion of CA8 was its rather 
startling conclusion that a school board member has, in effect, 
no imnrunity of any kind. The holding was that the District 
Court erred in instructing the jury that the plaintiffs had 
to prove malice as a predicate to recovering damages against 
school board members: 
"It instructed the jury that the plaintiffs had 
to prove that the defendants acted with malice 
toward the plaintiffs. No such specific intent 
need be proved to recover compensatory damages 
(in a 1983 action). It need only be established 
that the defendants did not, in the light of all 
of the circumstances act in good faith. The test 
is an objective rather than a subjective, one." 
Petitioners, on this point, argue that there is absolute 
irmnunity from liability for acts within the scope of a school 
board's official duty and authority. They point out that in 





beverages was valid, and that the Board was acting in the 
course of its lawful authority. I cannot ·accept, however, 
4. 
any doctrine of absolute immunity. Without having reexamined 
the relevant authorities, I believe the correct rule is that 
a school board member - like other public officials - has a 
qualified immunity which does require proof of malice. 
Perhaps a school board member, in exercising discretion (as 
in a disciplinary case), is entitled to a presumption that he 
acted in good faith. Otherwise, few would be willing to serve 













Mr. Justice Powell 
Ron Carr 
-
DATE: October 14, 1974 
No. 73-1285 Wood v. Strickland ~~ ' ·~~) 
This is an altogether extraordinary case. Everyone seems 
to have cast reason to the winds. The case began with the 
..------------
Mena, Arkansas, school board's rather rigid and clumsy response 
to the sophomorie prank of three sophomore school girls. It 
con tinued through remarkably inept handling by the district 
court, in proceedings marked by tactical errors on all sides. 
On appeal to the Eigth Circuit, that court chose to raise 
the red banner of substantive due process, reviewing the 
school board's determination as if the case were a criminal 
\ appeal and, effectively, eliminating any good faith defense 
to an action for damages under§ 1983. Finally the case comes 
to this Court, accompanied by notably unhelpful briefs. 7( 
Absurd cases, like great cases, can, I suppose, make bad 
law. I hope that this one does not. 
~! 
I recommend that you vote to reverse CA8's decision, but 
that reversal be accompanied by directions that CA8 remand 
the case to the district court to determine whether, in light 
of this Court's decision here and in Goss v. Lopez, the school 
*The amicus brief to the Childhood and Government Project is, 
however, extremely helpful, although it does not deal with 
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afforded respondents procedural protections reasonable under 
the circumstances and hence in compliance with procedural due 
process principles. I recognize that this recommendation requires 
some explanation. 
A. Petitioner's first argument - that education is not .___ 
a liberty or property right and therefore not an interest 
requiring Fourteenth Amendment protection - should be categorically 
rejected. Rodriguez in no way supports petitioner's position. 
1Your opinion in that case, for purposes here, held only that 
education is not itself a constitutional right, unequal 
\ provision of which would require strict scrutiny under the 
equal protection clause. This Court's jurisprudence, however, 
has long since passed by the notion that only constitutional 
rights mandate due process protection. The question here is 
whether education is, under state law, an entitlement or 
benefit, which the state may take away only if it does so in 
a reasonable way. Your opinion in Arnett, and the Court's 
decisions in Sinderman, Roth (to say nothing of Goldberg v. 
Kelly) strongly suggest that education is a liberty or 
property interest within the meaning of the due process clause. 
And all eleven circuits have so held. 
B. The second question is: What does due process require, 
and were these requirements followed here? These questions 
should be answered, of course, without any regard to school 
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(1) Procedural due process: The detennination of what 
procedural protections are required has long been held to 
depend on a weighing of the state's interest, in light of the 
circumstances,in efficient decision-making designed to 
accomplish legitimate ends against the harm caused an 
individual by mistaken deprivation. School di sciplinary 
sanctions vary greatly, from,~-&·, a temporary suspension, 
hastily imposed in an emergency and without pennanent con-
sequences, to lengthy suspensions or permanent expulsions, 
where the deprivation may cause significant and permanent 
adverse effects, and no emergency justifies haste. The 
requirements of procedural due process should vary -
accordingly. 
Whatever may be said of temporary suspensions of the 
Goss v. Lopez variety, it seems to me that when a school board 
contemplates imposing a significant sanction like that involved 
here, it is incumbent upon it to act with procedural care. 
I suggest that absent exigent circumstances, the school board 
should afford students notice of the charges against them, and 
a prompt opportunity to present their case, normally before 
any sanction is levied. None of these procedures is 
expensive and, absent emergency circumstances, none would 
normally harm the school's interest. 
Moreover, I don't think the procedural issues are out 
of this case. The school board's initial decision was taken 1"~ 
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mistaken view of the facts. It is true that, subsequently, 
(
the board did conduct a hearing . But it was (again, apparently) ~ 
limited to the question of punishment. While CA8 said that 
this qearing might have washed out the deficiencies of 
,~,:,.,;..., dee., stoK., 
the r it did not so decide. Finally, respondents have 
raised procedural objections all along, and do so here. In 
these circumstances, I think CA8 should be directed to remand 
to the district court, to determine whether any exigency 
justified the board's failure to conduct a hearing of the 
f a cts. Indeed, had such a hearing been held, the supposed 
"substantive" issue might never have arisen. 
2. Substantive due process: It seems to me that there 
is a constitutional basis for federal court review of a school -
board's substantive decisions only when those decisions impinge 
02:_ federal substantive rights - e.g., rights under the First 
--- -- -
Amendment (Tinker), or those concerned with racial or other 
sorts of irrational discrimination. In short, school boards 
must be allowed full discretion to formulate, interpret, and 
apply disciplinary rules within the substantive limits of the 
Constitution. But one must be extremely careful. I think 
that these substantive limits should also be held to preclude, 
under the general due process rubric of fairness, application 
of rules to conduct to which they bear no rational relationship 
whatsoever or to sanctions imposed without any basis of fact. 
Such cases will undoubtedly be extremely rare, and will often, 




to note that the standard for detennining a violation of 
right is, in all instances, objective. 
5. 
Here, of course, the rule against intoxicating liquor 
infringed no substantive right. Moreover, the board members 
application of the rule to what they supposed to be the facts 
was neither utterly irrational nor baseless. In short, CA8 
was wrong. 
3. Section 1983 immunity: The question is whether, and 
to what extent, school board members should be liable in 
damages when, in disciplining students, they violate constitutional 
rights. This question, of course, does not arise unless, in 
fact, constitutional rights have been violated. Thus, if the 
Court decides that (1) a remand on the procedural question 
• is not called for and (2) the board's action here violated no substantive right, the§ 1983 question need not be reached. 
If the question is reached, I think that under Scheuer v. 
Rhodes and other decisions of this Court, school board members 
0 
,,,'" 
should be held entitled to qualified, but not absolu~e, 
i ~ ity - i.e., school board members should be entitled to 
a defense in a§ 1983 action that (a) they had objective 
~.~ reason to believe that their action was justified and (b) 
~~J they acted with good faith, and without malicious motive 
Generally, I think, the distribution of burden ~ or intent, 
vv:'· V of proof on these points depends on the .nature of the right 
r '1i" ¥' / violate .. d. Normally, however, defendants should be required 
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while plaintiffs would have to rebut this by producing proof 
of malicious intent. These standards would automatically take 
into account the high degree of dis cretion and flexibility that 
must be accorded school boards. They would, at once, avoid 
interference, due to fear of damage actions, with the necessary 
operations of school boards, and, at the same time, provide 
students ·with a reasonable degree of advance protection. 
In conclusion, I think this case is far more important 
than its absurd history indicates, and requires more thorough 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,JR. 
-
j,1tp"rttttt ~ettrl of fltt 'Jlfui:tt~ ~bdts 
--zts£tittgt~ ~. ~ 2.llffe.>t.1 
December 9, 1974 
t- lLE CC.1 
PLEASE RETURN 
TO F\LE 
No. 73-1285 WOOD v. STRICKLAND 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Although I believe I can join in Parts III and 
IV of Byron's memorandtnn, I do not agree that a school 
board member may be held liable in damages under§ 1983 
for not knowing "the basic, unquestioned constitutional 
rights of his charges". This is a higher level of 
knowledge than could be expected of Supreme Court Justices. 
Accordin71y, I will circulate a dissent from Part II of Byron s memorandtnn if it becomes a Court 
opinion. 
t__ ,+. (/. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
- -
December 9, 1974 
No. 73-1285 WOOD v. STRICKLAND 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Although I believe I can join in Parts III and 
IV of Byron's memorandum, I do not agree that a school 
board member may be held liable in damages under§ 1983 
for not knowing "the basic, unquestioned constitutional 
rights of his charges". This is a higher level of 
knowledge than could be expected of Supreme Court Justices. 
AccordinylY, I will circulate a dissent from 




JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
- -.;§u:p-r ttttt Q}ouri ll f iltt 'Jlltriith .;§mus 
~a,glpttgton, ~. Q}. 2.LlffeJ!.~ 
December 9, 1974 
Re: No. 73-1285, Wood v. Strickland 
Dear Byron, 
I agree with your memorandum in this case. 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
Sincerely yours, 





,jnpumt Q}ourl of tlrt %tilth .:§ta±tg 
'J!lbwlfinghm. ~. QJ. 20,5'1-~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM O . DOUGLAS December 9, 1974 
Dear Byron: 
In 73-1285, WOOD v. STRICKLAND 
please join me in your proposed disposition 
of December 7, 1974. 
t})uy 
Wi:,~ouglas 
Mr. Justice White . 




~lt}lt"ttttt {lJtturl d tqt ~b j;btfts 
'lhtsltinghm. g). <q. 2llffe~, V 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL December 10. 1974 
' 
Re: No. 73-1285 -- John P. Wood et ?-1• v. Peggy Strickland 
Dear Byron: 
I am in general agreement with your memorandum. 
Mr. Justice White 





JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.e -
~u:prtm:t <!fcm-t of t4t ~nitth ~btlts-
.. :tsltinghm. J. <q. 2.0ffeJ!.' 
December 10, 1974 
V 
RE: No. 73-1285 Wood v. Strickland, etc. 
Dear Byron: 
I agree. 
Mr. Justice White 




~n;ntmt <!Jcnrl cf flrt ~b ~Wt.s' 
Jfa,g~ ~- <!J. 20.;r.l!' 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR. 
Q 
December 16, 1974 
No. 73-1285 - Wood v. Strickland 
Dear Byron: 
I joined the Memorandum and I also join the 
opinion in the above. 
Mr. Justice White 





- -;$u:pnmt C!fou.d of tltt ~tb _ibtftg 
'IJlUlJrbtghm. ~. (!f. 2.0ffe'l,, ✓ 
CHAMBERS Of" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL December 17, 1974 
Q 
Re: No. 73-1285 -- John P. Wood et al. v. Peggy Strickland 
Dear Byron: 




Mr. Justice White I 
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To: The Chi ef Justi ce 
Mr. Justi ce Douglas 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
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[December - , 1974] 
Respondents Peggy Strickland and Virginia Crain 
brought this lawsuit against petitioners, who were mem-
bers of the school board at the time in question, two 
school administrators, and the Special School District of 
Mena, Arkansas, 1 purporting to assert a cause of action 
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and claiming that their federal 
constitutional rights to due process were infringed under 





lic High School on the grounds of their violation of a 
school regulation prohibiting the use or possession of in- _/ __ . k__,.A ~. _ -~ ,,, 
toxicating beverages at school or school activities. The p"Y , - -_, ~ J 
complaint as amended prayed for compensatory and /P _ 
11 
punit ive damages against all petitioners, injunctive relief ~, ~ 
allowing respondents to resume attendance, preventing 
1 The Court of Appeals affirmed the directed verdicts awarded 
by the Dist rict Court to P. T . Waller, the principal of Mena Migh 
School at the time in question, S. L. Inlow, then superintendent of 
schools, and the Mena Special School District. 485 F . 2d 186, 191 
(1973) . Since respondents have not cross-petitioned, the cases of 





9 ~ ~_}fj__~I!!._ 




WOOD v. STRICKLAND 
-
petitioners from imposing any sanctions as a result of the 
expulsion, and restraining enforcement of the challenged 
regulation, declaratory relief as to the constitutional in-
validity of the regulation, and expunction of any record 
of their expulsion After the declaration of a mistrial 
arising from the jury's failure to reach a verdict, the 
District Court directed verdicts in favor of petitioners on 
the ground that petitioners were immune from damage 
suits absent proof of malice in the sense of ill will towards 
respondents. 348 F. Supp. 244 (WD Ark. 1972). The 
Court of Appeals, finding that the facts showed a viola-
tion of respondents' rights to "substantive due process,'' 
reversed and remanded for appropriate injunctive relief 2 
and a new trial on the question of damages. 4.85 F. 2d 
186 ( 1973). A petition for rehe9,ring en bane was denied, 
with three judges dissenting. See ibid., at 191. Certio-
rari was granted to consider whether this application of 
due process by the Court of Appeals was warranted and 
whether that Court's expression of a standard governing 
immunity for school board members from liability for 
compensatory damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 was the 
correct one. 416 U. S. 935 (1974) . 
I 
The violation of the school regulation 3 prohibiting the 
use or possession of intoxicating beverages at school or 
2 The Court of Appeals noted that reinstatement was no longer 
possible since the term of expuls1011 had ended, but that the respond-
ents were entitled to have the records of the explusions expunged 
and to be relieved of any other continuing punishment, if any. 485 
.F. 2d, at 190. 
3 "3. Suspension 
"b. Valid causes for su,;pension from ,;chool on first offense: Pupils· 
found to be guilty of any of the following shall be suspended from 
school on the first offense for the balance of the semester and such 
-
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3 
school activities with which respondents were charged 
concerned their "spiking" of the punch served at a meet-
ing of an extracurricular school organization attended by 
parents and students. At the time in question, respond-
ents were 16-years-old and were in the 10th grade. The 
relevant facts begin with their discovery that the punch 
had not been prepared for the meeting as previously 
planned. The girls then agreed to "spike" it. Since 
the County in which the school is located is "dry," re-
spondents and a third girl drove across the state border 
into Oklahoma and purchased two 12-ounce bottles of 
"Right Time," a malt liquor. They then bought six 
IO-ounce bottles of a soft drink, and , after having mixed 
the contents of the eight bottles in an empty milk carton, 
returned to school. Prior to the meeting, the girls ex-
perienced second thoughts about the wisdom of their 
prank, but by then they were caught up in the force of 
events and the intervention of other girls prevented them 
from disposing of the illicit punch. The punch was 
served at the meeting, without apparent effect . 
Ten days later, the teacher in charge of the extracur-
ricular group and meeting, Mrs. Curtis Powell, having 
heard something about the "spiking," questioned the girls 
about it. Although first denying any knowledge, the 
girls admitted their involvement after the teacher said 
that she would handle the punishment herself. The next 
day, however, she told the girls that the incident was 
becoming increasingly the subject of talk in the school 
~uspension will be noted on the permanent record of the student 
along with reason for suspem;1on. 
" ( 4) The use of intoxicating beverage or posse,-sion of same at 
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and that the principal, P. T. Waller, would probably hear 
about it. She told them that her job was in jeopardy 
but that she would not force them to admit to Waller 
what they had done. If they did not go to him then, 
however, she would not be able to help them if the inci-
dent became "distorted." The three girls then went to 
Waller and admitted their role in the affair. He sus-
pended them from school for a maximum two-week 
period, subject to the decision of the school board. 
Waller also told them that the board would meet that 
nigh , a t e girls cou tell their parents about the 
meeting, but that the parents should not contact any 
members of the board. 
Neither the girls nor their parents attended the school 
boar meeting t at nig t. Bot Mrs. Powell and Waller, 
after mliKmg tneir reports concerning the incident, recom-
mended leniency. At this point, a telephone call was 
received by S. L. Inlow, then the superintendent of 
schools, from Mrs. Powell's husband, also a teacher at 
the high school, who reported that he had heard that the 
third girl involved had been in a fight that evening at 
a basketball game. Inlow informed the meeting of the 
news, although he did not mention the name of the girl 
involved. Mrs. Powell and Waller then withdrew their I 
recommendations of leniency, and the board voted to 
e2P~l the girls from school for the remainder of the semes-
ter, a period of approximately three months. 
' ._,.;:i,. 
The board subsequently agreed to hold another meet-
fog on the matter, and one was held approximately two 
weeks after the first meeting. The girls, their parents, 
and their counsel attended this session. The board 
began with a reading of a written statement of facts as 
it had found them.4 The girls admitted mixing the malt 
4 "FACTS FOUND BY SCHOOL BOARD 
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5 
the punch with the intent of "s iking" it, 
. .._,.____ o fore o its rule punishing such 
violations y sue su stantial suspensions. Neither 
Mrs. Powell nor Waller was present at this meeting. 
The board voted not to change its policy and, as before, 
to expel the girls for the remainder of the semester.'5 
II 
The District Court instructed the jury that a decision 
for respondents had to be premised upon a finding that 
petitioners acted with malice in expelling them and 
defined "malice" as meaning "ill will against a person-
a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or 
excuse." 348 F. Supp., at 248. In ruling for petitioners 
after the jury had been unable to agree, the District 
Court found "as a matter of law" that there was no e"vi-
dence from which malice could be inferred. Id., at 253. 
dents of Mena High School and subject to the governing rules and 
policies of Mena High School. 
"2. That on or about February 7, 1972 these three girls were 
charged with the responsibility of providing refreshments for a school 
function, being a gathering of students of the Home Economic class 
and some of their parents, on school premises, being the auditorium 
building of Mena High School, and being under the direction of Mrs. 
Curtis Powell. 
"3. That the three girls in question traveled to Oklahoma, pur-
chased a number of bottles of malt liquor, a beer type beverage, 
and later went onto school premises with the alcoholic beverage and 
put two or more of the bottles of the drink into the punch or liquid 
refreshment which was to be served to members of the class and 
pa.rents." App. 137. 
The Court of Appeals in its statement of the facts observed that 
the malt liquor and soft drinks were mixed by the girls prior to 
their rett1rn to school, 485 F. 2d, at 187, and petitioners in their 
brief recite the facts in this manner. Brief for Petitioners, at 5. 
This discrepancy in the board's findings of fact is not material to 
any issue now before the Court. 
5 By takmg a correspondence course and an extra course later, the 
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The Court of Appeals, however, viewed both the 
instructi~ision of the District Court as 
being erroneous. Specific intent to harm wrongfully, 
it held, was not a requirement for the recovery of dam-
ages. Instead, "[i]t need only be established that the I 
defendants ~t, in the light of all the circumstances, 
act in good faith. The test is an objective, rather than 
a~subjective, one." 485 F. 2d, at 191 (footnote omitted). 
1 _.,._,+ "1 C, tr- <J 
I q &'3 
Petitioners as members of the school board assert here, 
as they did below, an absolute immunity from liability 
under § 1983 and at the very least seek to reinstate the 
judgment of the District Court. If they are correct and 
the District Court's dismissal should be sustained, we need 
go no further in this case. Moreover, the immunity ques-
tion involves the construction of a federal statute, and our 
practice is to ea w1 possi ly dispositive E.tatutory issues 
before reaching questions turning on the construction of 
the Constitution. Cf. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 529, 
549 ( 197 4). 6 We essentially sustain the position of the 
Court of Appeals with respect to the immunity issue. \~ 
6 In their original complaint , respondents sought only injunctive 
and declaratory relief. App. 11-12. In their amended complaint, 
they added a prayer for compensatory and punitive damages. App. 
92. Trial was to a jury; and the District Court in ruling on motions 
after declaring a mistrial appears to have treated the case as having 
developed into one for damages only since it entered judgment for 
petitioners and dismissed the complaint on the basis of their good-faith 
defense. In a joint motion for a new trial, respondents specifica!Jy 
argued that the District Court had erred in treating the case as one 
for the recovery of damages only and in failing to give them a trial 
and ruling on their claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. App. 
131. The District Court denied the motion. App. 133. Upon appeal, 
respondents renewed these contentions, and the Court of Appeals, after 
finding a substantive due process violation, directed the District 
Court to give respondents an injunction requiring expunction of the 
expulsion records and restraining any further continuing punishment. 
-
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The nature of the immunity from awards of damages 
under § 1983 available to school administrators and 
school boar=a-members is not a question which the lower 
federal courts have answered with a single voice. There 
is general ~ment on the exis~nce of a "good r~" 
immunity, but the- courts have eTiher emphasized dif-
ferent factors as elements of goo fa1t or have not given 
~
specific content to the goo -faith standard.7 
485 F . 2d, at 190. In their brief in this Court petitioners urge that 
we reverse the Court of Appeals and order the complaint dismissed. 
Brief for Petitioners, at 48. Respondents, however, again stress that 
the relief they sought included equitable relief. Brief for Respond-
ents, at 47-48, 50. 
In light of the record in this case, we are uncertain as to the basis 
for the District Court's judgment, for immunity from damages does 
not ordinarily bar equitable relief as well . The opinion of the 
Court of Appeals does not entirely dispel this uncertainty. With the 
case in this posture, it is the better course to proceed directly to 
the question of the immunity of school board members under § 1983. 
7 In McLaughlin v. Tilendis , 398 F . 2d 287, 290-291 (CA7 1968), 
a case relied upon by the Court of Appeals below, the immunity was 
extended to school-board members and the superintendent of schools 
only to the extent that they could establish that their decisions were 
founded on "justifiable grounds." Cf. Scoville v. Bd. of Ed. of Joliet 
Twp. H. S., 425 F. 2d 10, 15 (CA7) , cert. denied, 400 U. S. 826 
(1970) . In Smith v. Losee, 485 F. 2d 334, 344 (CAlO 1973) (en 
bane), cert. denied, 417 U. S. 908 (1974), the immunity protecting 
university officials was described as one of good faith and the absen_ce 
of malice where the facts before the officials "showed a good and 
valid reason for the decision although another reason or reasons 
advanced for nonrenewal or discharge may have been constitutionally 
impermissible." The District Court in Kirstein v. Rector an<I \ 
Visitors of University of Virginia, 309 F. Supp. 184, 189 (ED Va. 
1970), extended the immunity to action taken in good faith and in 
accordance with "long standing legal principle." See also Wood v. 
Goodman, 381 F. Supp. 413, 419 (Mass. 1974) ; Thonen " · Jenkins, 
374 F . Supp. 134, 140 (EDNC 1974) ; Taliaferro v. State Council 
of Higher Education, 372 F. Supp. 1378, 1382-1383 (ED Va. 1974) ; 
Vanderzanden v. Lowell School District No . 71, 369 F . Supp. 67, 72 
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This Court has decided three cases dealing with the' 
scope of the immunity protecting various types of gov-
ernmental officials from liability under ~ 1983. In Ten-
ney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 ~e question 
was found to be one essentially of statutory construc-
tion .8 Noting that the language of § 1983 is silent with 
r~es, the Court concluded that there 
was no basis for believing that Congress intended to 
eliminate the traditional immunity of legislators from 
civil liability for acts done within their sphere of legisla-
tive action. That immunity, "so well grounded in history 
and reason ... ," id., at 376, was absolute and conse-
Supp. 1081, 1083-1084 (ED Tenn. 1972); Adamian v. University of 
Nevada, 359 F. Supp. 825, 834 (Nev. 1973); Boyd v. Smith, 353 F. 
Supp. 844, 845-846 (ND Ind. 1973); Hayes v. Cape Henlopen School 
District. 341 F. Supp. 823, 829 (Del. 1972); Schreiber v. Joint School 
District No. 1, Gibraltar, Wis., 335 F . Supp. 745, 748 (ED Wis. 
1972); Endicott v. Van Petten, 330 F. Supp. 878, 885-886 (Kan . 
1971); Holliman v. Martin, 330 F . Supp. 1, 13 (WD Va. 1971); , 
McDonough v. Kelly , 329 F . Supp. 144, 150-151 (N. H. 1971) ; 
Cordova v. Chonko , 315 F. Supp. 953, 964 (ND Ohio 1970) ; Gouge v. 
Joint School District No . 1, :no F . Supp. 984, 990, 992-993 (WD 
Wis. 1970). 
8 "Did Congress by the general language of its 1871 statute mean 
to overturn the tradition of legislative freedom achieved in England 
·by Civil War and carefully preserved in the formation of State and 
National Governments here? Did it mean to subject legislators to 
civil liability for acts done within the sphere of legislative activity? 
Let us assume, merely for the moment, that Congre:;s has consti-
tutional power to limit the freedom of S1 ate legislators acting within 
their traditional sphere. That would be a big assumpt10n. But we 
would have to make an even rasher assumption to find that Congress 
thought it had exercised the power. These are difficulties we cannot 
hurdle. The limits of §§ 1 and 2 of the 1871 statute .. were not 
spelled out in debate. We cannot believe that Congres:;-i1self a 
staunch advocate of legislative freedom- would impinge on a tradi-
tion so well grounded in history and reason by covert inclusion in 
the.general language before us.'' Tenney v. Brarulhove, supra, at 376. 
- -
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quently did not depend upon the motivations of the legis-
lators. In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 554 ( 1967), 
finding that ~tive record gives no clear indi-
cation that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all 
common-law immunities" in enacting § 1983, we con-
cluded that the common-law doctrine of absolute udic1a 
immunity survived. Similarly, § 1983 did not destroy ----------the traditional rule that a policeman, making an arrest 
in good faith and with probable cause, is not liable for 
damages, although the person arrested proves innocent. 
In addition, the Court said: "Although the matter is not 
entirely free from doubt, the same consideration would 
seem to require excusing him from liability for acting 
under a statute that he reasonably believed to be valid 
but that was later held unconstitutional, on its face or 
as applied." Id., at 555 (footnote omitted.) ~ly~ c _ I _ A ;._, 
last Term we held that the chief executive officer of a ~ , 
State, the senior and subordinate officers of the State's __, 
National Guard, and the president of a state-controlled 
university were not absolutely immune from liability 
under § 1983, but concluded that -under prior precedent 
and in light of the obyious need to avoid discouraging 
€ffective official action , public officers charged with a 
considerable range of responsibility and discretion were 
€ntitled to immunity, but only if they acted in good faith 
:as defined by the Court: 
" [I] n varying scope, a qualified immunity is avail-
able to officers of the executive branch of government, 
the variation being dependent upon the scope of 
discretion and responsibilities of the office and all 
the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at 
the time of,Jhe action on which liability is sought to 
be based./ It is the existen.ce of reasonable grounds ( 
for the belief formed at the time and in light of all 
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that affords a basis for qualified immunity of execu-
tive officers for acts performed in the course of official 
conduct." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 247-
248 (1974). 
Common-law tradition. recognized in our prior de-
cisions, and strong public-policy reasons also lead to a 
construction of ~ 1983 extending a qualified good-faith 
immunit to school board members!) from liability for 
damages under that sect10n. Although there have been 
differing emphases and formulations of the common-law 
immunity of public school officials in cases of student ex-
pulsion or suspension, state courts have generally recog-
nized that such officers should be protected from tort lia-
bility under state law for all good-faith. non-malicious 
action taken to fulfill their official duties.10 
As the facts of this case reveal, school board members 
function at different times in the nature of legislators and 
9 The Court of Appeals upheld the directed verdicts as to Inlow 
and Waller on the ground that there was no evidence in ;;upport of 
the claims against them. 485 F. 2d, at 191. Since re;;pondents have 
not sought review of that decision, we are not confronted with the 
question of the appropriate standard of immunity under § 1983 for 
school administrative officers. 
10 See Donahue v. Richards, 38 Me. 379 (1854); Dritt "· Snodgrass, 
66 Mo. 286 (1877); McCormick v. Burt, 95 Ill. 263 (1880); Board 
of Education of Cartersville Y. Purse, 101 Ga. 422, 28 S. E. 896 
(1897) ; Board of Ed. of City of Covington "· Booth, 110 Ky. 807 , 
62 S. W. 872 (1901) ; Morrison v. City of Lawrence, 181 Mas:;. 127, 63 
N. E. 400 (1902); Sorrels v. Matthews, 129 Ga. 319, 58 S. E. 819 
(1907); Douglass v. Campbell, 89 Ark. 254, 116 S. W. 211 (1909); 
Barnard v. Shelbourne, 216 Mass. 19, 102 N. E. 1095 (1913) (injunc-
tive relief); Sweeney "· Young, 82 N. H. 159, 131 A. 155 (1925) 
(absolute immunity for arts taken within range of general authority) . 
See also 68 Am. Jur. 2d . School;;§ 268, at 592-593 (1973); 79 C. J. S., 
Schools and School Districts§ 503 (d), at 541 (1952); Prosser, Hand-
book of the Law of Torts § 132, at 989 ( 4th ed. 1971); Hamilton & 
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adjudicators in the school disciplinary process. Each of 
these functions necessarily involves the exercise of dis-
cretion, the weighing of many factors, and the formula-
tion of long-term policy.11 "Like legislators and judges, 
these officers are entitled to rely on traditional sources 
for the factual information on which they decide and act." 
Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra, at 246. As with executive offi-
cers faced with instances of civil disorder, school officials, 
confronted with student behavior causing or threatening 
disruption, also have an "obvious need for prompt action, 
and decisions must be made in reliance on factual infor-
mation supplied by others." Ibid. 
Liability for damages for every action which is found 
subsequently to have been violative- of a student's consti-
tutional rights and to have caused compensable injury 
would unfairly impose upon the school decisionmaker 
the burden of mistakes made in good faith in the course 
of exercising his discretion within the scope of his official 
duties. School board members, among other duties, must 
judge whether there have been violations of school regu-
lations and, if so, the appropriate sanctions for the viola-
tions. Denying any measure of immunity in these cir-
cumstances "would contribute not to principled and fear-
less decision-making but to intimidation." Pierson v. 
Ray, supra, at 554. The imposition of monetary costs 
for mistakes which were not unreasonable in the light of 
all the circumstances would undoubtedly deter even the 
most conscientious school· decisionmaker from exercising 
his judgment independently, forcefully, and in a manner 
best serving the long-term interest of the school and the 
students. The most capable candidates for school board 
~ be deterred from seeking office if heavy 
11 See generally Campbell , Cunningham, & McPhee, The Orga. 
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burdens upon their private resources from monetary lia-
bility were a likely prospect during their tenure.12 
These considerations have undoubtedly played a prime 
role in the development by state courts of a qualified 
immunity protecting school officials from liability for 
damages in lawsuits claiming improper suspensions or ex-
pulsions.13 But at the same time, the judgment implicit 
in this common-law development is that absolute im-
munity would not be justified and would not sufficiently 
increase the ability of school officials to exercise their dis-
cretion in a forthright manner to justify the absence 
of a remedy for students subjected to intentional or other-
wise inexcusable deprivations. 
Tenney v. Brandhove, Piers-:m v. Ray, and Scheuer v. 
Rhodes drew upon a very similar background and were 
animated by a very similar judgment in construing§ 1983. 
Absent legislative guidance, we now rely on those same 
sources in determining whether and to what extent school 
officials are immune from damage suits under§ 1983. We ( 
think there must be a degree of immunity if the work of 
the schools is to go forward; and, however worded, the 
12 The overwhelming majority of school-board members are elected 
to office. See White, Local School Boards: Organization and Prac-
tices 8 (1962); Survey of Public Education in the Member Cities 
of the Council of Big City Boards of Education 3 (1968); Campbell, 
Cunningham, & McPhee, supra, at 164-170. Most of the school-
board members across the country receive little or no monetary 
compensation for their service. White, supra, at 67-79; Survey of 
Public Education, supra, at 3, 15-21; Campbell , Cunningham, & 
McPhee, supra, at 172. 
13 " [School directors] are authorized, and it is their duty to adopt 
reasonable rules for the government and management of the school, 
and it would deter responsible and suitable men from accepting the 
position, if held liable for damages to a pupil expelled under a rule 
adopted by them, under 1.he impression that the welfare of the schoof 
demanded it, if the courts should deem it improper." Dritt v. Snod-· 
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immunity must be such that public school officials under- / 61<. 
stand that action taken fo tlie good-faith fulfillment of 
..---:--~~-...,..-~--:--- ~ .....---:-:-.-,...:::----
t eir responsi ilities and within the bounds of reason 
uncler all tne circumstances w1Ilriot5epuiiislled and that 
th~ thefr discretwn with undue 
timidity. , 
"Public officials, whether governors, mayors or po-
lice, legislators or judges, who fail to make decisions 
when they are needed or who do not act to imple-
ment decisions when they are made do not fully and 
faithfully perform the duties of their offices. Im-
plicit in the idea that officials have some immunity-
absolute or qualified-for their acts, is a recognition 
that they may err. The concept of immunity as-
sumes this and goes on to assume that it is better to 
risk some error and possible injury from such error 
than not to decide or act at all .... " Scheuer v. 
Rhodes, supra, at 241-242 (footnote omitted). 
The disagreement between the Court of Appeals and 
the District Court over the immunity standard in this 
case has been put in terms of an "ob,iective" versus a 
"subjective" test of good faith. As we see it, the appro-
priate"standard necessarily contains elements of both. 
The official must himself oe acting mncerely and with a 
belief that he is doing right, but an act found to have 
violated a student's constituti~l rights can be no more 
justified by 1 norance or disregard of settled, indis utable 
~ on the part of one entruste · with supervision of stu-
~ts daily lives than by the presence of actual malice. 
To be titled to a special exemption from the categorical 
remedi language of § 1983 in a case in which his action 
has bee found to have violated a student's constitutional 
cighj;s, school board member , who has voluntarily under-
{ taken t e t~k-~f supervising the operation of the school 
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standard of conduct based not only on permissible inten-
tions, but also on knowledge of the basic, unquestioned 
constitutional rights of his charges. ' uch a standard l~ 
~ 
- neither unposesa11unlair burden upon a person assuming 
a responsible public office requiring a high degree of in-
telligence and judgment for the proper fulfillment of its 
duties, nor an unwarranted burden in light of the value 
which civil rights have in our legal system. Any lesser} 
standard woul9. . .deny much of the promise of § 1983. 
Therefore, in the specuic context of school disci line, we 
hold that a school oar rriember is not immune from 
liability for damages under § 1983 if he knew or reason-
ably should have known that the action he took within 
h1s sphere of officia res onsibility wou o ate the con-
stitutional rig ts of the student a ected o if he took the 
act10n w1 the malicious intention to cause a deprivation 
of constitutional rights or other injury to the student~ -: 
That is not to say that school board members are 
1 
"charged with predicti'ng the future course of constitu-
tional law." Pierson v. Ray, supra, at 557. A compen-
satory award will be appropriate only if the school board 
member has acted with such an impermissible motivation 
or with such disregard of the student's clearly established 
constitutional rights that his action cannot reasonably 
be characterized as being in good faith. 
~ 
III 
The Court of Appeals, based upon its review of the 
facts but without the benefit of the transcript of the testi-
mony given at the four-day trial to the jury in the Dis-
trict Court,14 found that the Board had made its decisions 
14 At the time of the Court of Appeals decision, the testimony 
at the trial to the jury had not been transcribed because of counsel's 
concern with limiting litigation costs. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 23. The 
transcript was filed in the District Court after certiorari was granted .. 
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to expel the girls on the basis of no evidence that the 
school regulation had been violated: 
"To justify the suspension, it was necessary for 
the Board to establish that the students possessed 
or used an 'intoxicating' beverage at a school-spon-
sored activity. No evidence was presented at either 
meeting to establish the alcoholic content of the 
liquid brought to the campus. Moreover, the Board 
made no finding that the liquid was intoxicating. 
The only evidence as to the nature of the drink was 
that supplied by the girls, and it is clear that they 
did not know whether the beverage was intoxicating 
or not." 485 F. 2d, at 190. 
Although it did not cite the case as authority, the Court 
of Appeals was apparently applying the due process ra-
tionale of Thompson v. (}ity of Louisville, 362 U. S. 199, 
206 ( 1960) ,15 to the public school disciplinary process. 
The applicability of Thompson in this setting, however, 
is an issue that need not be reached in this case.16 The 
record reveals <,f the FeeoFa l,Hl:B ]Qd Y~ to the conc)mign.--'L---' 
that the decision of the Court of Appeals was based upon 
an erroneous construction of the school regulation in 
question. Once that regulation is properly construed, 
the Thompson issue disappears. 
The Court of Appeals interpreted the school regulation 
prohibiting the use or possession of intoxicating bever-
15 See also Vachon v. N ew Hampshire, 414 U. S. 478, 480 (1974); 
Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U. S. 111, 112 (1969); Johnson v. Florida, 
391 U. S. 596, 598-599 (1968) ; Shuttleworth v. City of Birmingham, 
382 U. S. 87, 94-95 (1965) ; Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157 
(1961) . Cf. lnt'l Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 
U. S. 233, 246 (1971) . 
16 That is not to say that the requirements of due process do not 
--a-tt.,...a-c~h-k expulsions. Over t he past 15 years the courts of appeals 
have without except10n held that due process requirements must be 
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ages as being linked to the definition of "intoxicating 
liquor" under the Arkansas Alcohol Control Act 11 which 
restricts the term to beverages with an alcoholic content 
exceeding 5% by weight.18 Testimony at the trial. how-
ever, established convincingly that the term "intoxicat-
ing beverage" in the school regulation was not intended 
at the time of its adoption in 1967 to be linked to the 
definition of the State Alcohol Control Act or to any 
other technical definition of "intoxicating." 19 The adop-
tion of the regulation was at a time when the school 
board was concerned with a previous beer-drinking epi-
sode.20 It was applied prior to respondents' case to 
17 See Arkansas Stat. §§ 48-503, 48-107 (1947). 
18 The Court of Appeals referred to comments which seemed also 
to adopt this construction made by the District Court in its findings 
of fact when it denied respondents' motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion . 485 F. 2d, at 190; App. 80. After noting the District Court's 
initial view that. petitioners would find it difficult to prove the 
requisite alcoholic content, the Court of Appeals expressed puzzle-
ment at the failure of the lower court to discuss the absence of 
such evidence in its final opinion. The District Court, however, 
indicated in its instructions that the question of the proper con-
struction of the regulation would. not be relevant if the jury found 
that the school officials in good faith considered the malt liquor and 
punch to fall within the regulation. 348 F. Supp., at 248. The 
District Court's ultimate conclusion apparently made unnecessary 
a final decision on the coverage of the regulation. To avoid any 
misunderstanding of its decision, however, the Court of Appeals indi-
cated that the school board had the authority to prohibit the use 
and possession of alcoholic beverages or to continue its policy of 
proscribing only intoxicating beverages. 485 F. 2d, at 191. 
19 Two members of the school board at the time that the regula-
tion was adopted testified that there had been no discussion of tying 
the regulation to the State Alcohol Control Act and that the intent 
of the board members was to cover beer. Reporter's Transcript 
(Rep. Tr.) 466-467 (tel;timony of petitioner Wood); 589-590 (testi-
mony of Mrs. Gerald Goforth). 
20 See the minutec-: of the board meeting at which the regulation 
-
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another student charged with posse~sion of beer.z1 In 
its statement of facts issued prior to the onset of this 
litigation, the school board expressed its construction of 
the regulation by finding that the girls had brought an 
"alcoholic beverage" onto school premises. 22' The girls ~ 
themselves. admitted knowing at the time of the incident 
that they were doing something wrong which might be 
punished. 23 In light of this evidence, the Court of 
Appeals was ill advised to supplant the interpretation 
of the regulation of those officers who adopted it and are 
entrusted with its enforcement. Cf. Grayned v. City of 
Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 110 (1972). 
When the regulation is construed to prohibit the use 
and possession of beverages containing alcohol, there was 
no absence of evidence before the school board to prove 
the charge against respondents. The girls had admitted 
that they intended to "spike" the punch and that they 
had mixed malt liquor into the punch that was served. 
The third girl estimated at the time of their admissions 
to Waller that the malt liquor had an alcohol content 
of 20 %. After the decision had been made and this 
litigation had begun, it was conclusively determined that 
the malt liquor in fact had an alcohol content not exceed-
was adopted in App. 103-104. See also Rep. Tr. 431-432 (testimony 
of Mrs. Mary L. Spencer, also a board member when the regulation 
was adopted) ; 587-588 (Mrs. Goforth) . 
21 The student was suspended in October 1971 for the possession 
of beer at a school activity. There is no indication in the record of 
the alcoholic content of the beer. See Rep. Tr. 258-259, 268-269 
( testimony of former Superintendent Inlow) . 
22 See n. 4, supra. Soon after this litigation had begun, the board 
i,;sued a statement which said that the regulation ''prohibits the use 
and possession of alcoholic beverage on school premises. " App. 
139. 
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ing 3.2% by weight.214 Testimony at trial put the alcohol 
content of the punch seTved at 0.91 %.25 
Given the fact that there was evidence supporting the 
charge against respondents, the contrary judgment of the 
Court of Appeals is improvident. It is not the role of 
the federal courts to set aside decisions of school adminis-
trators which the court may view as lacking a basis in 
wisdom or compassion. Public high school students do 
have substantive and procedural rights while at school. 
See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District, 393 U. S. 503 (1969); West Virginia 
State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 
(1943); Goss v. Lopez, ante , - U.S. - (1974). But ) 
§ 1983 does not extend the right to relitigate in federal 
court evidentiary questions arising in school disciplinary 
proceedings or the proper construction of school regula-
tions. The system of public education that has evolved5 I 
in this Nation relies necesarily upon the discretion and 
judgment of school administrators and school board 
members, and § 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle 
for federal court correction of errors in the exercise of 
that discretion which do not rise to the level of viola-
tions of specific constitutional guarantees. See Epper-
son v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Tinker, supra, 
at 507. 
IV 
Respondents' complaint alleged that their procedural 
due process rights were violated by the action taken by 
petitioners. · App. 9. The District Court did not discuss 
this claim in its final opinion, but tli.e Court of Appeals 
viewed it as presenting a substantial question. It con-
24 This percentage content was established through the deposition 
of an officer of the company that produces "Right Time" malt liquor~ 
App. 93-94. 
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eluded that the girls were denied procedural due process 
at the first school board meeting, but also intimated that 
the second meeting may have cured the initial procedural 
deficiencies. Having found a substantive due process 
violation, however, the court did not reach a conclusion 
on this procedural issue. 485 F . 2d, at 190. 
Respondents have argued here that there was a pro-
cedural due process violation which also supports the 
result reached by the Court of Appeals. Brief for 
Respondents, at 27-28, 36. But because the District 
Court did not discuss it, and the Court of Appeals did 
not decide it, it would be preferable to have the Court of 
Appeals consider the issue in the first instance. 
I suggest that the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion, 
~ ~--~ -~ >f--r -~ ~ 
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January 7, 1975 
No. 73-1285, Wood v. Strickland 
Dear Byron: 
In accord with our talk, I write to suggest 
a modification of your draft opinion that would meet 
my concern. 
I am with you all the way to the first full 
paragraph on page 13. That paragraph, which carries 
over to near the bottom of page 14, imposes a duty on 
school board members not to act in "ignorance or 
disregard of settled, indisputable law". In my view, 
this is a considerably higher standard than the more 
generalized one heretofore approved by the Court. As 
I have indicated, I think the Scheuer formulation is 
about as specific as one can be in this area. 
With this thought in mind, you might consider 
a substitution for the last paragraph in your Part II 
reading along the following lines: 
The disagreement between the Court of 
Appeals and the District Court over the 
immunity standard in this case has been 
put in terms of an "objective" versus a 
"subjective" test of good faith. As we 
,,. - -
see it, the appropriate standard 
necessarily contains elements of both. 
The school official must himself be 
acting sincerely and with the belief 
that he is doing right, but this alone 
is not enough. As we said in Scheuer, 
"[i]t is the existence of reasonable 
grounds for belief formed at the time 
2, 
and in light of all the circumstances, 
coupled with good faith belief, that affords 
a basis for qualified inmunity of ••• 
officers for acts performed in the course 
of official conduct." .!!!• at 247-248. 
Thus, action which is the subject of a civil 
rights suit also must be tested in light 
of the discretion and responsibilities of 
school board members and all relevant 
circumstances as they reasonably appear~d to 
exist at the time the challenged action 
occurred. Such a standard neither imposes 
an unfair burden •pon a person assuming 
a responsible public office requiring a high 
degree of intelligence and judgment for the 













unwarranted burden in light of the 
value which civil rights have in our 
legal system. Any lesser standard would 
deny much of the promise of§ 1983. 
3. 
If you are disposed to substitute something 
along the foregoing lines for the paragraph that concerns 
me, I will join your entire opinion. Otherwise, I will 
dissent from Part II. 
I am aware that you have a Court and this may 
present a problem for you. I will of course understand 
if you stand pat. 




.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
- -
~u:p-r-tttu (!fo-urt o-f tJrt ~nittlt ~tatts 
~agqiughttt, 19. (!f. 20ffe'!' 
January 8, 1975 
Re: No. 73-1285 - Wood v. Strickland 
Dear Lewis: 
I have looked over your suggestion in this 
case. I suggest you write and circulate. The 
others who have joined me can then see what you 
have in mind. 
Sincerely, 
~~ 
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No. 73-1285 
John P. Wood et al., Petitioners, 
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V. I 
Peggy Strickland, A Minor,- by 
Mr. and Mrs. Virgil Justice, 
Her Parents and Next 
Friends, et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari 
to the United States 
Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit. 
[January -, 1975] 
MR. JusTICE POWELL, concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part. 
I join in Parts I , III, and IV of the Court's opinion, 
and agree that the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
should be vacated and the case remanded. I dissent 
from Part If which appears to impose a higher standard 
of care upon public school officials, sued under § Hl83, 
than that heretofore required of any other official. 
The holding of the Court on the immunity issue is 
set forth in the margin.1 It would impose personal 
1 The disagreement between the Court of Appeals a.nd the District 
Court over the immunity standard in this case has been put in terms 
of a.n "objective" versus a "subject ive" test of good faith. As we 
see it, the appropriate standard necessarily contains elements of both. 
The official must himself be acting sincerely and with a belief that 
he is doing right, but an act violating a student's constitut ional rights 
can be no more justified by ignorance or disregard of settled, indis-
putable law on the par t of one entrusted with supervision of stu-
dents' daily lives t han by the presence of actual malice. To be 
ent itled t o a special exemption from the categorical remedial lan-
guage of § 1983 in a case in which his action violated a student's 
constitutional rights, a school board member, who has voluntarily 
undertaken the task of supervising the operation of the school and 
the activit ies of the students, must be held to a standard of conduct 
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liability on a school official who acted sincerely and in 
the utmost good faith , but who was found-after the 
fact-to have acted in "ignorance ... of settled, indis-
putable law." Ante, at 13. Or, as the Court also puts 
it, the school official must be held to a standard of con-
duct based not only un good faith "but also on knowledge 
of the basic, unquestioned constitutional rights of his 
charges." Ibid. Moreover, ignorance of the law ls 
· explicitly equated with "actual malice.'' Ibid. This 
harsh standard, requiring knowledge of what is charac-
. terized as "settled, indisputable la.w," leaves little sub-
, stance to the doctrine of qualified immunity. The 
I 
· Court's decision appears to rest on an unwarranted 
, assumption as to what lay school officials know or can 
know about the law and constitutional rights. These 
officials will now act at the peri~i of some judge orlury 
· 'based not only on permissible intentions, but also on knowledge of 
the basic, unquestioned constitut'iona1 rights of his charges. Such a 
standard neither imposes an unfa'ir 'burden upon a person assuming 
a responsible public office requ'iring a high degree of intelligence and 
judgment for the proper fulfillment of its duties, nor an unwarranted 
'burden in light of the value which civil rights have in our legal 
system. Any lesser standard would deny much of the promise of 
§ 1983. Therefore, in the specific context of school discipline, we 
hold that a school board member is not immune from liability for 
damages under ·§ 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have known 
that the act'ion he took within his sphere of official responsibility 
would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or 
'if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a depriva-
tion of constitutional rights or other injury to the student. That is 
not to say that school board members are "charged with predicting 
the future course of constitutional law." Pierson v. Ray, supra, at 
557. A compensatory award will be appropriate only if the school 
board member has acted with such an impermissible motivation or 
with such disregard of the student's clearly established constitutional 
rights that his action cannot reasonably be characterized as being 
in good faith. 
- -
73-1285-CONCUR & DISSENT 
WOOD v. STRICKLAND 3 
subsequently finding that a good-faith belief as to the 
applicable law was mistaken and hence actionable.2 
The Court states the standard of required knowledge 
in two criptic phrases: "settled, indisputable law" and 
"unquestioned constitutional rights." Presumably these 
are intended to mean the same thing, although the mean-
ing of neither phrase is likely to be self-evident to con-
stitutional law scholars-much less the average school 
board member. One need only look to the decisions of 
this Court-to our reversals, our recognition of evolving 
concepts, and our five-to-four splits-to recognize the 
hazard of even informed prophecy as to what are "un-
questioned constitutional rights." Consider, for example, 
toUay's five-to-four decision in Gross v. Lopez, ante, at 
-, holding that a junior high school pupil routinely 
sti'spended for as much as a single day is entitled to due 
process. I suggest that most lawyers and judges would 
hkve thought, prior to this decision, that the law to the 
contrary was settled, indisputable, and unquestioned.
3 
Less than a year ago, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 
232 (1974) , and in an opinion joined by all participating 
members of the Court, a considerably less demanding 
2 The opinion expressly states that actual malice is presumed where 
one acts in ignorance of the law; thus it would appear that even 
good-faith reliance on the advice of counsel is of no avail. 
3 The Court's rationale in Goss suggests, for example, that school 
officials may infringe a student 's right to education if they place 
him in a noncollege preparatory tract or deny him promotion with 
his class without affording a due process hearing. See ante, at -
(PowELL, J., dissenting). Does this mean that school officials who 
fail to provide such hearings in the future will be liable under § 1983 
if a court subsequently determines that they were required? 
For another current example of how unsettled constitutional law, 
deemed by some at least to b e quite settled, may turn out to be, 
see the decision and opinions in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. 
Di-Chem, Inc., ante, at -, and compare with l\lJ:R. JusTICE STEW-
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standard of liability was approved with respect to two 
of the highest officers of the State, the Governor and 
Adjutant General. In that case, the estates of students 
killed at Kent State University sued these officials under 
§d983. After weighing the competing claims, the Court 
concluded: · ' '. 
"These consider_atii:ms suggest that, in varying 
scope, a qualified: i~munity is . ayailab1~ to officers 
of the executive branch Qf government, the variation 
being dependent upon the scope ·c;:f'di~?retion and 
responsibilities of the office and all the circumstanceg 
as they reasonably appeared.~t the. time of the action 
on which liability is sought to be based. It is the 
ex-ktence of rea.sonable gro'unds for the belief farmed 
at the time and in light of all the circumstances, 
coupled with good-faith beliefs that affords a basis 
for. qualified irnmunity __ of executive officers for acts 
performed in the course of official co1iduct." Id., 
at 248. (Italic_s supplied.) 
T,he italicized sentence from Scheuer states, as I view 
it, . the correct standard for qualified immunity of a gov-
ernment official: whether in light of the discretion and 
responsibilities of his office, and under all of the circum-
s~ances as they appeared at the time, the officer acted 
;r,easonably and in good faith. This was the standard 
,aplied to the Governor of a State charged with mali-
ciously calling out national guardsmen who killed and 
.wounded Kent State students.4 Today's opinion offers 
4 The decision of the Court in Scheuer with respect to qualified 
·immunity is consistent with Chief Justice Warren's opinion for t he 
Court in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 ( 1966) , where it was said: 
" If the jury believed the testimony of t he officers and disbelieved 
that of the ministers, and if the jury found that the offi cers reason-
ably believed in good faith that the arrest was constitutional, then a 
- -
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no reason for imposing a more severe standard on school 
board members charged only with wrongfully expelling 
three ·teenage pupils. 
There are some 20,000 school boards, each with five or 
1n0re-,-memb'ers, and thousands of school superintendents 
'and school principals. Most of the school board mem-
1bers are popularly elected, drawn from the citizenry at 
large and possess no unique competency in divining the 
law. Few cities and counties provide any compensation 
.~for service on school boards, and often it is difficult to 
· persuade qualified persons to assume the burdens of this 
,:important function in our society. Moreover, even if 
\·counsel's advice constitutes a defense, it may safely be 
'-assumed that few school boards and school officials have 
' ready access to counsel or indeed have deemed it neces-
sary to consult counsel on the countless decisions that 
necessarily must be made in the operation of our public 
schools. 
In view of today's decision significantly enhancing the 
possibility of perso.nal liability, one must wonder whether 
qualified persons. will continue in the desired numbers 
to volunteer for service in public education. 
verdict for the officers would follow even though the arrest was in 
fact unconstitutional." 386 U. S. 557. 
As in Scheuer, the standard prescribed is one of acting in good faith 
in accordance with reasonable belief that the action was lawful and 
justified. Not even police officers were held liable for ignorance of 
"settled, indisputable law." 
.. ' . - -
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part. 
I join in Parts I, III, and IV of the Court's opinion, 
and agree that the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
should be vacated and the case remanded. I dissent 
from Part II which appears to impose a higher standard 
of care upon public school officials, sued under § 1983, 
than that heretofore required of any other official. 
The holding of the Court on the immunity issue is 
- set forth in the margin.1 It would impose personal 
1 The di~agreement between the Court of Appeals and the District 
Court over the immunity standard in this case has been put in terms-
of an "objective" versus a '·subjective" test of good faith . As we 
see it, the appropriate standard necessarily contains elements of both, 
The official must him;,elf be acting sincerely and with a belief that 
he is doing right, but an act violating a student 's constitutional rights 
can be no more justified by ignorance or disregard of settled, indis-
putable law on the part of one entrusted with supervision of ,stu~ 
dents' daily lives than by the presence of actual malice. To be 
entitled to a special exemptfon from the categorical remedial lan-
guage of § 1983 in a case in which his action violated a student's 
constitutional rights, a school board member, who has voluntarily 
~mdertaken the task of supervising the operation of the school and 
th~ activities of the students, must l:)e held to a standard of conduct 
. . -
2 
73-1285-CONCUR & DISSENT 
WOOD v. STRICKLAND 
-
liability on a school official who acted sincerely and i11 
the utmost good faith. but who was found-after the 
fact-to ha.ve acted in "ignora.nce . . . of settled, indis-
putable law." Ante, at 13. Or. as the Court also puts 
it, the school official must be held to a sta.ndard of con-
duct based not only on good faith "but also on knowledge 
of the basic, unquestioned constitutional rights of his 
charges." Ibid. Moreover. ignorance of the law is 
explicitly equated with "actual malice." Ibid. This 
harsh standard, requiring knowledge of what is charac-
terized as "settled. indisputable law." leaves little sub-
stance to the doctrine of qualified immunity. The 
Court's decision appears to rest on an unwarranted 
assumption as to what lay school officials know or can 
know about the law and constitutional rights. These 
officials will now act at the peril of some judge or jury 
based not only on permissible intentions, but also on knowledge of 
the ba:;ic, unquestioned constitutional rights of his charges. Such a 
standard neither impm,es an unfair burden upon a person assuming 
a responsible public office requiring a high degree of intelligence and 
judgment for the proper fulfillment of its duties, nor an unwarranted 
burden in light of the value whirh civil rights have in our legal 
system. Any lesser standarp would deny much of the promise of 
§ 1983. Therefore, in the specific context of school discipline, we 
hold that II school bom·d member is not immune from liability for 
-dam11ges under § 1983 if he knew or reason11bl~1 should lrnve known 
that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility 
would Yiolate the coni:;titutional rights of the student affected, or 
if he took the action with the m11licious int.ention to c11use a depriva-
tion of const itutioml rights or other injury to the student. That is 
not to say th11t school board members are "ch11rged with predicting 
the future course of com,titntional law." Pierson v. Ray, supra, at 
557 . A compensatory award will be appropriate only if the school 
boa.rd member has acted with such an impermissible motivation or 
with such disreg11rd of the student's clearly established constitutional 
rights that his action cannot reasonably be characterized as bein_g 
in good faith . 
-
'73-1285-CONCUR & DISSENT 
WOOD v. STRICKLAND 
-
3 
subsequently finding that a good-faith belief as to the 
applicable law was mistaken and hence actionable. 2 
The Court states the standard of required knowledge 
in two cryptic phrases: "settled. indisputable law" and 
"unquestioned constitutional rights." Presumably these 
are intended to mean the same thing, although the mean-
ing of neither phrase is likely to be self-evident to con-
stitutional law scholars-much less the average school 
board member. One need only look to the decisions of 
this Court-to our reversals, our recognition of evolving 
concepts, and our five-to-four splits-to recognize the 
hazard of even informed prophecy as to what are "un-
questioned constitutional rights." Consider, for example, 
today's five-to-four decision in Goss v. Lope,z, ante, at 
-, holding that a junior high school pupil routinely 
suspended for as much as a single day is entitled to due 
process. I suggest that most lawyers and judges would 
have thought, prior to this decision, that the law to the 
contrary was settled, indisputable, and unquestioned.3 
Less than a year ago, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 
232 (1974), and in an opinion joined by all participating 
members of the Court, a considerably less demanding 
2 The opinion expressly states that actual malice is presumed where 
one acts in ignorance of the law; thus it would appear that even 
good-fait h reliance on the advice of counsel is of no avail. 
3 The Court's rationaie in Goss suggests, for example, that school 
officials may infringe a student's right to education if they place 
him in a noncollege preparntor~' tract or deny him promotion with 
his class without affording a due process hearing. See ante, at -
(POWELL, J ., dissenting). Does this mean that school officials who 
fail to provide such hearings in the future will be liable under § 1983 
if a court subsequently determines that they were required? 
For another current example of how unsettled constitutional law, 
deemed by some at least to be quite settled , may turn out to be, 
see the decision and opinions in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. 
Di-Chem, Inc ., ante, at - , and compare with MR. JusTICE STEW-
i\RT's dissent in Mitchell v. W. T . Grant, 416 U. S. 600, 629 (1974) . 
-
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standard of liability was approved with respect to two 
of the highest officers of the State, the Governor and 
Adjutant General. In that case, the estates of students 
killed a.t Kent State University sued these officials under 
§ 1983. After weighing the competing claims, the Court 
concluded: 
"These considerations suggest that, in varying 
scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers 
of the executive branch of government, the variation 
being dependent upon the scope of discretion and 
responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances 
as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action 
on which liability is sought to be based. It i,s the 
exi.stence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed 
at the time and in light of all the circumstances, 
coupled with good-faith belief that affords a basi.s 
for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts 
per/ ormed in the course · of official conduct." Id., 
at 247-248. (Italics supplied.) 
The italicized sentence from Scheuer states, as I view 
it, the correct standard for qualified immunity of a gov-
ernment official: whether in light of the discretion and 
responsibilities of his office, and under all of the circum-
stances as they appeared at the time, the officer acted 
reasonably and in good faith. This was the standard 
applied to the Governor of a State charged with mali-
ciously calling out national guardsmen who killed and 
wounded Kent State students.4 Today's opinion offers 
4 The decision of the Court in Scheuer with respect to qualified 
immunity is consistent with Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the 
Court in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1966), where it was said: 
"If the jury believed the testimony of the officers and disbelieved 
that of the ministers, and if the jury found that the officers reason-
ably believed in good faith that the arrest was constitutional, then a 
-
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no reason for imposing a more severe standard on school 
board members charged only with wrongfully expelling 
three teenage pupils. 
There are some 20,000 school boards, each with five or 
more members, and thousands of school superintendents 
and school principals. Most of the school board mem-
bers are popularly elected, drawn from the citizenry at· 
large and possess no unique competency in divining the 
law. Few cities and counties provide any compensation 
for service on school boards, and often it is difficult to 
persuade qualified persons to assume the burdens of this 
important function in our society. Moreover, even if 
counsel's advice constitutes a defense, it may safely be 
assumed that few school boards and school officials have 
ready access to counsel or indeed have deemed it neces-
sary to consult counsel on the countless decisions that 
necessarily must be made in the operation of our public 
schools. 
In view of today's decision significantly enhancing the 
possibility of personal liability, one must wonder whether 
qualified persons will continue in the desired numbers. 
to volunteer for service in public education. 
verdict for the officers would follow even though the arrest was in 
fact unconstitutional." Id., at 557. 
As in Scheuer, the standard prescribed is one of acting in good faith 
in accordance with reasonable belief that the action was lawful and 
justified. Not eYen police officers were held liable for ignorance of 
"settled, indisputable law." 
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JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
January 14, 1975 
Re: No. 73-1285 - Wood v. Strickland 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in the opinion, concurring in part 
and dissenting in part, which you have prepared in this case. 
Sincere!~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
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